Public Bill Committee

[Sir Nicholas Winterton in the Chair]
 [Continuation from column 432]

On resuming—

Nicholas Winterton: I hope that people feel watered, fed and refreshed for the final straight of this match.

Schedule 16

The Law Society, solicitors, recognised bodies and foreign lawyers

Bridget Prentice: I beg to move amendment No. 44, in schedule 16, page 229, line 17, at end insert—
‘After section 1A insert—
“1B Restriction on practice as sole solicitor
(1) Rules under section 31 (rules as to professional practice etc) must provide that a solicitor may not practise as a sole solicitor unless he has in force—
(a) a practising certificate, and
(b) an endorsement of that certificate by the Society authorising him to practise as a sole solicitor (a “sole solicitor endorsement”).
(2) The rules may provide that, for the purposes of the rules and this Act, a solicitor is not to be regarded as practising as a sole solicitor in such circumstances as may be prescribed by the rules.
(3) The rules must prescribe the circumstances in which a solicitor may be regarded by the Society as suitable to be authorised to practise as a sole solicitor.”’.

Nicholas Winterton: With this it will be convenient to take Government amendments Nos. 45 to 68, Nos. 79 to 81, Nos. 83 to 92, Nos. 95 to 100 and amendment No. 106.

Bridget Prentice: The list of amendments is daunting, but they have been drafted in response to amendments tabled in the other place on behalf of the Law Society. They create new powers over sole practitioners similar to existing powers over regulated recognised bodies. They require solicitors who want to run a sole practice to apply for endorsement to do so and to be subject to specific regulatory requirements. They also ensure effective powers over sole solicitors’ employees.
The purpose of the amendments is to provide the Law Society with enhanced powers to regulate sole practitioners and their employees. They bring many of the Law Society’s powers in relation to sole practitioner firms into line with its powers over partnerships and LLPs, and sole practitioner firms are often as large and as complex as recognised bodies. Overall, the amendments will ensure that all legal services practices are regulated according to the same principles. The consumers of such services will receive the same level of regulatory protection, regardless of whether they obtain legal services from a sole solicitor or a recognised body.

Simon Hughes: These are good proposals.

Amendment agreed to.

Amendments made: No. 45, in schedule 16, page 230, line 12, at end insert—
‘(1A) An application under this section may include an application for a sole solicitor endorsement.’.
No. 46, in schedule 16, page 230, line 13, after ‘application’, insert ‘under this section’.
No. 47, in schedule 16, page 230, line 41, at end insert
‘(including, if the certificate has a sole solicitor endorsement, an efficient practice as a sole solicitor);’.
No. 48, in schedule 16, page 231, line 11, after ‘certificate,’, insert—
‘( ) in relation to each solicitor who holds a practising certificate, a statement as to whether there is in force a sole solicitor endorsement,’.—[Bridget Prentice.]

Henry Bellingham: I beg to move amendment No. 299, in schedule 16, page 231, line 22, leave out from ‘if’ to end of line 27 and insert
‘he has been required by rules made under section 35(1) to provide an accountant’s report and has failed to provide such a report within the time period prescribed under those rules,’.

Nicholas Winterton: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments: No. 305, in schedule 16, page 232, line 41, leave out sub-paragraph (5).
No. 306, in schedule 16, page 233, line 18, at end insert—
‘(12) The decision of the High Court on an appeal under subsection (6) or (9) shall be final.’.
No. 307, in schedule 16, page 233, line 22, at end insert—
‘( ) in subsection (2) for “six” substitute “9”,
( ) in subsection (4) for “six” substitute “9”,’.
No. 308, in schedule 16, page 238, line 28, at end insert—
‘(3) The rules may make different provision for different categories of solicitors and for different circumstances.’.
No. 309, in schedule 16, page 248, line 39, at end insert—
‘(2) After that section insert—
“44F Power for Society to rebuke and reprimand
(1) Where the Society has investigated whether there has been professional misconduct by a solicitor, or whether a solicitor has failed to comply with any requirement imposed by or by virtue of this Act or any rules made by the Society, and the Society is satisfied that there was professional misconduct on the part of the solicitor, or that the solicitor did fail to comply with such a requirement or rule, but the Society is not satisfied that it is in the public interest to make a complaint against the solicitor to the Tribunal, the Society may rebuke or reprimand the solicitor and, unless it considers that it is not in the public interest to do so, may make public both the fact that the solicitor has been rebuked or reprimanded and a summary of the misconduct or failure concerned.
(2) The Society may make rules providing for rights of appeal to the Tribunal against rebukes or reprimands made by the Society where they are made, or proposed to be made, public or in such other circumstances as the Society may prescribe.
(3) Rules made under subsection (2) may also make provision about the procedure and practice to be followed in relation to—
(a) investigations as to whether there has been professional misconduct by a solicitor, or whether a solicitor has failed to comply with any requirement imposed by or by virtue of this Act or any rules made by the Council;
(b) the making of rebukes and reprimands; and
(c) the making public of rebukes and reprimands under subsection (1).’.
No. 320, in schedule 16, page 252, line 44, leave out paragraph 59 and insert—
‘59 In section 69 (action to recover solicitor’s costs)—
(a) in subsection (1) for “taxed” substitute “assessed”,
(b) for subsection (2) substitute—
“(2) The requirements referred to in subsection (1) are that the bill—
(a) must be signed—
(i) by the solicitor, or on his behalf by any employee authorised by the solicitor to do so;
(ii) if the costs are due to a firm, by one of the partners of that firm, either in his own name or in the name of the firm, or on his behalf by any employee authorised by any partner to do so; or
(iii) be enclosed in, or accompanied by, a letter which is so signed and refers to the bill;
(b) must be delivered to the party to be charged with the bill, either—
(i) personally;
(ii) by being sent to him by post to, or left for him at, his place of business, dwelling-house, or last known place of abode;
(iii) (subject to subsection (2A)) where he has provided an e-mail address to the solicitor for that purpose, by being sent to him by e-mail to that address (and, if he required that any attachment to an e-mail be in any particular electronic format, in accordance with that requirement); or
(iv) (subject to subsection (2A)) where he has provided a fax number to the solicitor for that purpose, by being sent to him by fax to that number; and
where a bill is proved to have been delivered in compliance with those requirements, it shall not be necessary in the first instance for the solictor to prove the contents of the bill and it shall be presumed, until the contrary is shown, to be a bill bona fide complying with this Act.
(2A) Sub-paragraph (iii) or (iv) of subsection (2)(b) does not apply if the party to be charged with the bill has indicated to the solicitor, before the bill is sent, that he is not willing to accept delivery of a bill sent by the method in question.
(2B) A bill which is sent by fax or e-mail is to be treated as having been delivered the working day after the day on which it was sent (unless the contrary is proved) and in this subsection “working day” means a day which is not a Saturday, Sunday, Bank Holiday or other public holiday,” and
(c) after subsection (3) insert—
“(3A) In subsection (2)(a) where a signature is required, an electronic signature incorporated into the document shall satisfy this requirement and an electronic signature is as much of anything in electronic form as
(a) is incorprated into or otherwise logically associated with any electronic communication or electronic data; and
(b) purports to be so incorporated or associated for the purpose of being used in establishing the authenticity of the communication or data, the integrity of the communication or data, or both.”’.
No. 310, in schedule 16, page 257, line 33, leave out paragraph (a) and insert—
‘(a) for sub-paragraph (1)(a) substitute—
“(a) the Society has reason to suspect dishonesty on the part of a solicitor;”.
(aa) after that sub-paragraph insert—
“(aa) the Society has reason to suspect dishonesty on the part of—
(i) an employee of a solicitor, or
(ii) the personal representatives of a deceased solicitor,
in connection with that solicitor’s practice or in connection with any trust of which that solicitor is or formerly was a trustee;”,’.
No. 311, in schedule 16, page 258, line 8, at end insert—
‘(iii) after “practice” insert “or has failed or is failing properly to attend to his practice”,’.
No. 312, in schedule 16, page 262, line 18, at end insert—
‘( ) in paragraph (d) omit “such”.’.
No. 313, in schedule 16, page 262, line 35, at end insert—
‘(ca) for recognition to be made subject to such conditions as the Council at any time sees fit to impose in such circumstances as are specified in the rules;
(cb) for the Society to require, in such circumstances as may be specified in the rules, recognised bodies to satisfy the Society as to their continuing suitability to be recognised under this section;’.
No. 314, in schedule 16, page 263, line 20, at end insert—
‘( ) Rules made by the Council under subsection (1) and (2) may make different provision for different categories of person or body and for different circumstances.’.
No. 315, in schedule 16, page 264, line 16, at end insert
‘and, if any such person is a body corporate, it also includes a manager of that body corporate’.
No. 316, in schedule 16, page 264, line 21, at end insert—
‘“solicitor business” means a business consisting of or including solicitor services;’.
No. 317, in schedule 16, page 267, line 35, at end insert—
‘“body” includes an individual who is carrying on a business as a sole principal;’.
No. 318, in schedule 16, page 279, line 7, leave out sub-paragraph (3) and insert—
‘(3) For sub-paragraph (2)(c) substitute—
“(c) a relevant insolvency event occurs in relation to a recognised body;
(ca) the Society has reason to suspect dishonesty on the part of any manager of a recognised body; or”.’.
No. 319, in schedule 16, page 281, line 14, leave out from ‘partnership’ to ‘and’ in line 15 and insert—
‘or the business of a sole principal, to a former manager of the body (within the meaning of Schedule 2 to the Administration of Justice Act 1985),’.

Henry Bellingham: Schedule 16 rewrites the Solicitors Act 1974. It contains a great deal, including measures about practising certificates and the registration of holders. The issues include fees payable for practising certificates, measures about the roll or register as evidence and unqualified persons acting as solicitors. In fact, the schedule is a complete rewrite of the 1974 Act. When it comes to such large schedules, we have to take the Government at their word and give them the benefit of the doubt. We must also consult outside organisations, which is exactly what we have done.
The Government have responded satisfactorily to all the probing amendments tabled in the other place. Sarah Rivers of the Solicitors Regulation Authority has said:
“The SRA is broadly pleased with the substantial number of amendments that have been made to modernise our regulatory powers throughout the course of the Legal Services Bill’s passage in Parliament. We are especially grateful to the Conservative Front Bench, in tabling these technical amendments, for their help to achieve this.”
The SRA is particularly grateful to Lord Kingsland and Lord Hunt. There is only one outstanding issue. I am grateful that the Government have listened, because these are very technical and complicated amendments. As I have mentioned, we are effectively rewriting an earlier piece of legislation—I would not recommend doing that on a regular basis. We could almost have had a completely new solicitors Bill, but the Government decided to do it a different way by virtue of this schedule.
Amendment No. 307 seeks to provide for a longer period in which a solicitor can be suspended pending referral to the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal. The Government have made it clear that there are problems with the amendment. It is the only amendment that we have tabled that the Government have not been able to act on positively. Will the Minister tell us why that is?
This is really a congratulatory effort on my part. I would like to thank the Minister for listening to organisations such as the Law Society, the SRA and other bodies, which have had a constructive and imaginative input into the debate. As a consequence, we have a better and more effective schedule.
Having said that I was only going to talk for four minutes, I have now spoken for three minutes and 45 seconds. I will sit down, but once again, I want to thank the Minister and her team for listening very carefully and responding in a positive and helpful way—I wish that Ministers would do that the whole time. Fortunately, they do it from time to time, and when they do, we must congratulate and thank them.

Bridget Prentice: I would like to reassure the hon. Gentleman about amendment No. 307. We felt that it was not appropriate to extend the suspension from 12 to 18 months. Obviously, the SRA needs to be equipped to protect consumers from solicitors who have been convicted of fraud or serious crime. The amendment, however, might have had the undesirable effect of reducing incentives for the Law Society and the tribunal to deal with disciplinary cases swiftly. The SRA accepts that our concerns about long delays are important, and it has asked that the amendment is not pressed.

Simon Hughes: As the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk has said, this group and later groups of amendments concern the substantive law that governs the professions. The Law Society has promoted some of the changes, which the Minister picked up on. Have other people who might have an interest been consulted? We must be satisfied that there is broader confirmation that the Government are going in the right direction and that there are not any objections. I have understood the main objections, but I do not pretend to have my head round every single implication of all the changes to all the other Acts.
The Department has consulted people other than just the Law Society; it is satisfied this group of amendments and the other groups contain nothing that will cause anybody difficulty; and the amendments are all improvements to put the relevant houses in good order.

Henry Bellingham: I am grateful to the Minister for what she has explained to the Committee. I am satisfied about that one outstanding amendment, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendments made: No. 49, in schedule 16, page 231, line 40, after ‘application’, insert ‘for a practising certificate,
( ) if the application included an application for a sole solicitor endorsement, a decision to refuse the application for the endorsement’.
No. 50, in schedule 16, page 232, line 6, leave out ‘for a practising certificate’ and insert ‘under section 9’.
No. 51, in schedule 16, page 232, line 11, at end insert—
‘( ) direct the Society to make a sole solicitor endorsement on the applicant’s practising certificate and to issue that certificate subject to such conditions (if any) as the High Court may think fit,’.
No. 52, in schedule 16, page 232, line 16, after ‘it,’, insert—
‘( ) if the certificate has been endorsed with a sole solicitor endorsement, by order suspend the endorsement,’.
No. 53, in schedule 16, page 232, line 26, at end insert—
‘After section 13 insert—
“13ZA Application to practise as sole practitioner while practising certificate in force
(1) A solicitor whose practising certificate for the time being in force (his “current certificate”) does not have a sole solicitor endorsement, may apply to the Society for such an endorsement.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1) a practising certificate with a sole solicitor endorsement which is suspended is to be treated as having such an endorsement.
(3) A solicitor may not apply under subsection (1) if he is suspended from practice as a sole solicitor.
(4) An application must be—
(a) made in accordance with regulations under section 28, and
(b) accompanied by any fee payable under section 13ZB in respect of the endorsement applied for.
(5) Where a sole solicitor endorsement is granted to an applicant of a prescribed description, the applicant’s practising certificate shall have effect subject to any conditions prescribed in relation to applicants of that description.
“Prescribed” means prescribed by regulations under section 28(3B)(ea).
(6) A person who makes an application under this section may appeal to the High Court against—
(a) a decision to refuse the application, or
(b) a decision to impose a condition on a practising certificate in accordance with subsection (5).
(7) The Society may by rules make provision, as respects any application under this section that is neither granted nor refused by the Society within such period as may be specified in the rules, for enabling an appeal to be brought under this section in relation to the application as if it had been refused by the Society.
(8) On an appeal under this section the High Court may—
(a) affirm the decision of the Society,
(b) direct the Society to grant a sole solicitor endorsement,
(c) direct that the applicant’s practising certificate is to have effect subject to such conditions (if any) as the High Court thinks fit, or
(d) make such other order as the High Court thinks fit.
(9) In relation to an appeal under this section the High Court may make such order as it thinks fit as to payment of costs.
(10) The decision of the High Court on an appeal under this section shall be final.
13ZB Fee payable on making of sole solicitor endorsement
(1) Before a sole solicitor endorsement is granted under section 13ZA, there must be paid to the Society in respect of the endorsement a fee of such amount as the Society may from time to time determine.
(2) Different fees may be specified for different categories of applicant and in different circumstances.
(3) If a fee payable under this section would not otherwise be a practising fee for the purposes of section 51 of the Legal Services Act 2007, it is to be treated for the purposes of that section as such a fee.
(4) In subsection (3) “practising fee” has the meaning given by that section.”’.
No. 54, in schedule 16, page 232, line 32, after ‘if’, insert—
‘(a) under section 13ZA the Society grants a sole solicitor endorsement, or
(b) ’.
No. 55, in schedule 16, page 233, line 22, at end insert—
‘( ) in subsection (1), after “practising certificate” insert “or sole solicitor endorsement”,
( ) in subsection (6), after “practice” insert “or from practice as a sole solicitor”,’.
No. 56, in schedule 16, page 233, line 26, after ‘Court”,’ insert—
‘( ) in paragraph (b), for “shall not be suspended but” substitute “or sole solicitor endorsement shall not be suspended, but that the appellant’s certificate”,’.
No. 57, in schedule 16, page 234, line 12, at end insert—
‘After section 17 insert—
“17A Suspension of sole solicitor endorsement
(1) The making by the Tribunal or by the court of an order suspending a solicitor from practice as a sole solicitor shall operate to suspend any sole solicitor endorsement of that solicitor for the time being in force.
(2) For the purposes of this Act, a sole solicitor endorsement shall be deemed not to be in force at any time while it is suspended.
(3) Subsection (2) is subject to section 13ZA(2).
17B Duration and publicity of suspension of sole solicitor endorsement
(1) Where a sole solicitor endorsement is suspended, it expires on such date as may be prescribed by regulations under section 28.
(2) Where a solicitor’s sole solicitor endorsement is suspended—
(a) by an order under section 13(4), or
(b) by virtue of section 17A(1) in circumstances where the period of that suspension expires before the date on which his endorsement will expire,
the solicitor may at any time before the endorsement expires apply to the Society to terminate the suspension.
(3) Section 16(4) to (7) apply in relation to an application under subsection (2) as they apply in relation to an application under section 16(3).
(4) Where a solicitor’s sole solicitor endorsement is suspended by an order under section 13(4) or by virtue of section 17A(1), the Society shall forthwith cause notice of that suspension to be published and a note of it to be entered against the name of the solicitor on the roll.
(5) Where any suspension is terminated by virtue of section 16(4) or (5), as applied by subsection (3) of this section, the Society shall forthwith cause a note of that termination to be entered against the name of the solicitor on the roll and, if so requested in writing by the solicitor, a notice of it to be published.”’.
No. 58, in schedule 16, page 235, line 6, after ‘them”,’ insert—
‘( ) after that paragraph insert—
“(ca) sole solicitor endorsements and applications for them,”’.
No. 59, in schedule 16, page 235, line 22, after ‘certificates’, insert ‘or sole solicitor endorsements’.
No. 60, in schedule 16, page 235, line 24, after ‘certificates’, insert ‘or sole solicitor endorsements’.
No. 61, in schedule 16, page 235, line 36, at end insert—
‘(ea) prescribe descriptions of applicants, and conditions in relation to them, for the purposes of section 13ZA(5) (circumstances in which a practising certificate endorsed with a sole solicitor endorsement after it was issued must be made subject to prescribed conditions);’.
No. 62, in schedule 16, page 235, line 47, after ‘certificates’, insert ‘or sole solicitor endorsements’.
No. 63, in schedule 16, page 237, line 33, at end insert ‘, and
(c) after “solicitor” (in both places) insert “or any of his employees”.’.
No. 64, in schedule 16, page 239, line 7, at end insert—
‘After section 34 insert—
“Sole solicitors
34A Employees of solicitors
(1) Rules made by the Society may provide for any rules made under section 31, 32, 33A or 34 to have effect in relation to employees of solicitors with such additions, omissions or other modifications as appear to the Society to be necessary or expedient.
(2) If any employee of a solicitor fails to comply with rules made under section 31 or 32, as they have effect in relation to the employee by virtue of subsection (1), any person may make a complaint in respect of that failure to the Tribunal.
(3) If any employee of a solicitor fails to comply with rules made under section 34, as they have effect in relation to the employee by virtue of subsection (1), a complaint in respect of that failure may be made to the Tribunal by or on behalf of the Society.
34B Employees of solicitors: accounts rules etc
(1) Where rules made under section 32(1) have effect in relation to employees of solicitors by virtue of section 34A(1), section 85 applies in relation to an employee to whom the rules have effect who keeps an account with a bank or building society in pursuance of such rules as it applies in relation to a solicitor who keeps such an account in pursuance of rules under section 32.
(2) Subsection (3) applies where rules made under section 32—
(a) contain any such provision as is referred to in section 33(1), and
(b) have effect in relation to employees of solicitors by virtue of section 34A(1).
(3) Except as provided by the rules, an employee to whom the rules are applied is not liable to account to any client, other person or trust for interest received by the employee on money held at a bank or building society in an account which is for money received or held for, or on account of—
(a) clients of the solicitor, other persons or trusts, generally, or
(b) that client, person or trust, separately.
(4) Subsection (5) applies where rules made under section 33A(1) have effect in relation to employees of solicitors by virtue of section 34A(1).
(5) The Society may disclose a report on or information about the accounts of any employee of a solicitor obtained in pursuance of such rules for use—
(a) in investigating the possible commission of an offence by the solicitor or any employees of the solicitor, and
(b) in connection with any prosecution of the solicitor or any employees of the solicitor consequent on the investigation.
(6) Where rules made under section 34 have effect in relation to employees of solicitors by virtue of subsection (1), section 34(9) and (10) apply in relation to such an employee as they apply in relation to a solicitor.”’.
No. 65, in schedule 16, page 242, line 45, at end insert—
‘(ia) no employee of a solicitor shall employ or remunerate, in connection with the solicitor’s practice, the person with respect to whom the order is made,’.
No. 185, in schedule 16, page 243, line 45, leave out ‘in shares’.
No. 66, in schedule 16, page 244, line 6, after ‘solicitor’, insert
‘, or an employee of a solicitor,’.
No. 67, in schedule 16, page 244, line 8, after ‘solicitor’, insert ‘or employee’.
No. 186, in schedule 16, page 244, line 38, leave out ‘in shares’.
No. 187, in schedule 16, page 245, line 5, leave out ‘in shares’.
No. 68, in schedule 16, page 245, line 11, after ‘solicitor’, insert
‘or an employee of a solicitor’.—[Bridget Prentice.]

Bridget Prentice: I beg to move amendment No. 69, in schedule 16, page 245, line 38, after ‘purpose’, insert ‘—
(a) ’.

Nicholas Winterton: With this it will be convenient to take the following Government amendments Nos. 70 to 77,
 Governmentamendment No. 78, in schedule 16, page 248, line 39, at end insert—
‘After that section insert—
44D Disciplinary powers of the Society
(1) This section applies where the Society is satisfied—
(a) that a solicitor or an employee of a solicitor has failed to comply with a requirement imposed by or by virtue of this Act or any rules made by the Society, or
(b) that there has been professional misconduct by a solicitor.
(2) The Society may do one or both of the following—
(a) give the person a written rebuke;
(b) direct the person to pay a penalty not exceeding £2,000.
(3) The Society may publish details of any action it has taken under subsection (2)(a) or (b), if it considers it to be in the public interest to do so.
(4) Where the Society takes action against a person under subsection (2)(b), or decides to publish under subsection (3) details of any action taken under subsection (2)(a) or (b), it must notify the person in writing that it has done so.
(5) A penalty imposed under subsection (2)(b) does not become payable until—
(a) the end of the period during which an appeal against the decision to impose the penalty, or the amount of the penalty, may be made under section 44E, or
(b) if such an appeal is made, such time as it is determined or withdrawn.
(6) The Society may not publish under subsection (3) details of any action under subsection (2)(a) or (b)—
(a) during the period within which an appeal against—
(i) the decision to take the action,
(ii) in the case of action under subsection (2)(b), the amount of the penalty, or
(iii) the decision to publish the details,
may be made under section 44E, or
(b) if such an appeal has been made, until such time as it is determined or withdrawn.
(7) The Society must make rules—
(a) prescribing the circumstances in which the Society may decide to take action under subsection (2)(a) or (b);
(b) about the practice and procedure to be followed by the Society in relation to such action;
(c) governing the publication under subsection (3) of details of action taken under subsection (2)(a) or (b);
and the Society may make such other rules in connection with the exercise of its powers under this section as it considers appropriate.
(8) Before making rules under subsection (7), the Society must consult the Tribunal.
(9) A penalty payable under this section may be recovered as a debt due to the Society, and is to be forfeited to Her Majesty.
(10) The Lord Chancellor may, by order, amend paragraph (b) of subsection (2) so as to substitute for the amount for the time being specified in that paragraph such other amount as may be specified in the order.
(11) Before making an order under subsection (10), the Lord Chancellor must consult the Society.
(12) An order under subsection (10) is to be made by statutory instrument subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.
(13) This section is without prejudice to any power conferred on the Society or any other person to make an application or complaint to the Tribunal.
44E Appeals against disciplinary action under section 44D
(1) A person may appeal against—
(a) a decision by the Society to rebuke that person under section 44D(2)(a) if a decision is also made to publish details of the rebuke;
(b) a decision by the Society to impose a penalty on that person under section 44D(2)(b) or the amount of that penalty;
(c) a decision by the Society to publish under section 44D(3) details of any action taken against that person under section 44D(2)(a) or (b).
(2) Subsections (9)(b), (10)(a) and (b), (11) and (12) of section 46 (Tribunal rules about procedure for hearings etc) apply in relation to appeals under this section as they apply in relation to applications or complaints, except that subsection (11) of that section is to be read as if for “the applicant” to “application)” there were substituted “any party to the appeal”.
(3) Rules under section 46(9)(b) may, in particular, make provision about the period during which an appeal under this section may be made.
(4) On an appeal under this section, the Tribunal has power to make such order as it thinks fit, and such an order may in particular—
(a) affirm the decision of the Society;
(b) revoke the decision of the Society;
(c) in the case of a penalty imposed under section 44D(2)(b), vary the amount of the penalty;
(d) in the case of a solicitor, contain provision for any of the matters mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (d) of section 47(2);
(e) in the case of an employee of a solicitor, contain provision for any of the matters mentioned in section 47(2E);
(f) make such provision as the Tribunal thinks fit as to payment of costs.
(5) Where by virtue of subsection (4)(e) an order contains provision for any of the matters mentioned in section 47(2E)(c), section 47(2F) and (2G) apply as if the order had been made under section 47(2E)(c).
(6) An appeal from the Tribunal shall lie to the High Court, at the instance of the Society or the person in respect of whom the order of the Tribunal was made.
(7) The High Court shall have power to make such order on an appeal under this section as it may think fit.
(8) Any decision of the High Court on an appeal under this section shall be final.
(9) This section is without prejudice to any power conferred on the Tribunal in connection with an application or complaint made to it.”’.
No. (a), in line 12, leave out lines 12 to 14 and insert—
‘(3) The Society may publish details of any action it has taken under subsection (2)(a) or (b), unless it considers that it is not in the public interest to do so.’.
No. (b), in line 81, at end insert—
‘( ) vary the decision of the Society;’.
Government amendment No. 82
Government amendment No. 93
 Governmentamendment No. 94, in schedule 16, page 273, line 38, at end insert—
‘After that paragraph insert—

“Disciplinary powers of the Society
14B (1) This paragraph applies where the Society is satisfied that a recognised body, or a manager or employee of a recognised body, has failed to comply with a requirement imposed by or by virtue of this Act or any rules applicable to that person by virtue of section 9 of this Act.
(2) The Society may do one or both of the following—
(a) give the person a written rebuke;
(b) direct the person to pay a penalty not exceeding £2,000.
(3) The Society may publish details of any action it has taken under sub-paragraph (2)(a) or (b), if it considers it to be in the public interest to do so.
(4) Where the Society takes action against a person under sub-paragraph (2)(b), or decides to publish under sub-paragraph (3) details of such action under sub-paragraph (2)(a) or (b), it must notify the person in writing that it has done so.
(5) A penalty imposed under sub-paragraph (2)(b) does not become payable until—
(a) the end of the period during which an appeal against the decision to impose the penalty, or the amount of the penalty, may be made under paragraph 14C, or
(b) if such an appeal is made, such time as it is determined or withdrawn.
(6) The Society may not publish under sub-paragraph (3) details of any action under sub-paragraph (2)(a) or (b)—
(a) during the period within which an appeal against—
(i) the decision to take the action,
(ii) in the case of action under sub-paragraph (2)(b), the amount of the penalty, or
(iii) the decision to publish the details,
may be made under paragraph 14C, or
(b) if such an appeal has been made, until such time as it is determined or withdrawn.
(7) The Society must make rules—
(a) prescribing the circumstances in which the Society may decide to take action under sub-paragraph (2)(a) or (b);
(b) about the practice and procedure to be followed by the Society in relation to such action;
(c) governing the publication under sub-paragraph (3) of details of action taken under sub-paragraph (2)(a) or (b);
and the Society may make such other rules in connection with the exercise of its powers under this paragraph as it considers appropriate.
(8) Before making rules under sub-paragraph (7), the Society must consult the Tribunal.
(9) A penalty under this paragraph may be recovered as a debt due to the Society, and is to be forfeited to Her Majesty.
(10) The Lord Chancellor may, by order, amend paragraph (b) of sub-paragraph (2) so as to substitute for the amount for the time being specified in that paragraph such other amount as may be specified in the order.
(11) Before making an order under sub-paragraph (10), the Lord Chancellor must consult the Society.
(12) An order under sub-paragraph (10) is to be made by statutory instrument subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.
(13) This paragraph is without prejudice to any power conferred on the Society, or any other person, to make an application or complaint to the Tribunal.
14C (1) A person may appeal against—
(a) a decision by the Society to rebuke that person under paragraph 14B(2)(a) if a decision is also made to publish details of the rebuke;
(b) a decision by the Society to impose a penalty on that person under paragraph 14B(2)(b) or the amount of that penalty;
(c) a decision by the Society to publish under paragraph 14B(3) details of any action taken against that person under paragraph 14B(2)(a) or (b).
(2) Subsections (9)(b), (10)(a) and (b), (11) and (12) of section 46 of the 1974 Act (Tribunal rules about procedure for hearings etc) apply in relation to appeals under this paragraph as they apply in relation to applications or complaints, except that subsection (11) of that section is to be read as if for “the applicant” to “application)” there were substituted “any party to the appeal”.
(3) Rules under section 46(9)(b) of the 1974 Act may, in particular, make provision about the period during which an appeal under this paragraph may be made.
(4) On an appeal under this paragraph, the Tribunal has power to make an order which—
(a) affirms the decision of the Society;
(b) revokes the decision of the Society;
(c) in the case of a penalty imposed under paragraph 14B(2)(b), varies the amount of the penalty;
(d) in the case of a recognised body, contains provision for any of the matters mentioned in paragraph 18(2);
(e) in the case of a manager or employee of a recognised body, contains provision for any of the matters mentioned in paragraph 18A(2);
(f) makes such provision as the Tribunal thinks fit as to payment of costs.
(5) Where, by virtue of sub-paragraph (4)(e), an order contains provision for any of the matters mentioned in sub-paragraph (2)(c) of paragraph 18A, sub-paragraphs (4) and (5) of that paragraph apply as if the order had been made under sub-paragraph (2)(c) of that paragraph.
(6) An appeal from the Tribunal shall lie to the High Court, at the instance of the Society or the person in respect of whom the order of the Tribunal was made.
(7) The High Court shall have power to make such order on an appeal under this paragraph as it may think fit.
(8) Any decision of the High Court on an appeal under this section shall be final.
(9) This paragraph is without prejudice to any power conferred on the Tribunal in connection with an application or complaint made to it.”’.
No. (a), in line 12, leave out lines 12 to 14 and insert—
‘(3) The Society may publish details of any action it has taken under subsection (2)(a) or (b), unless it considers that it is not in the public interest to do so.’.
No. (b), in line 81, at end insert—
‘( ) varies the decision of the Society;’.

Bridget Prentice: Again, I hope to speak briefly to the amendments, which are technical. They would provide the scope of the Law Society’s powers, so that they were properly applied to the correct persons. The power to rebuke and to fine is an important one, and the approved regulators must be able to take appropriate action against those whom they regulate. The powers in the amendments would allow the society to act quickly and effectively when its rules are breached and when there is a finding of professional misconduct against a solicitor.
The intention is that more minor rule breaches and professional misconduct would be dealt with by the Law Society, while the solicitors disciplinary tribunal would determine the more serious cases. The SDT would have an unlimited power to fine, but the maximum penalty for the Law Society would be £2,000.

Henry Bellingham: The Conservatives support the amendments. They are spot on and we thank the Minister for tabling them. [ Interruption. ] I was put off by that noise, Sir Nicholas, but I said that we support the amendments.

Nicholas Winterton: My attention was also diverted; I trust that the instrument has now been switched off. I do not know whose it was—

Tobias Ellwood: I request an inquest.

Nicholas Winterton: After the Committee is over.

John Mann: I presume, Sir Nicholas, that it is in order to move amendments (a) and (b)?

Nicholas Winterton: It is in order to speak to them; if you wish to move them formally, that will come later.

John Mann: I shall speak to them separately, as they are quite different.
Amendment (a) would make a technical change to Government amendment No. 78. It would change the obligation to publish from one that would need a positive step to be taken to an obligation to consider that it would not be in the public interest to publish. It is a subtle but important change and would result in an automatic presumption that things would be put in the public domain rather than it having to be proven in each case. It would assist good working to ensure that, unless there was good reason not to do so, everything would be put in the public domain. I am sure that the Minister will be fully convinced by the logic of my argument.
Amendment (b) would allow the variation by a tribunal of decisions of the Law Society. That is important, because if the tribunal has to decide yea or nay—all or nothing—there would be more danger of a clever solicitor making a defence that was partially convincing. There would thus be more likelihood of the tribunal saying no, even on a technicality, because it would have no option. In such instances, the tribunal ought to be able to make a halfway determination. It strikes me that the balance would otherwise always be with the clever or technical argument, which could dominate tribunal decisions, whereas allowing a variation would mean that the tribunal could determine whatever it chose, based on all the facts.

Bridget Prentice: I imagine that we agree that there ought to be transparency in the Law Society’s decision making process. In many circumstances, it will clearly be in the public interest to publish once a fine or rebuke has been issued. However, I am not sure that it should be the default position for disciplinary action of that type to be published automatically. As it happens, I am not convinced that amendment (a) would achieve automatic publication unless it was not in the public interest, because it states that the Law Society “may” publish.
Given the intention behind my hon. Friend’s amendment, I shall explain our view. We believe that due consideration should be given in each case. However, it is more appropriate and probably more proportionate to take action as set out in Government amendments Nos. 78 and 94, in which it is anticipated that the Law Society would at the time of the determination consider whether or not it was in the public interest to publish. That leads to the idea that it may not necessarily be appropriate to publish determinations.
My hon. Friend’s other amendment would allow the tribunal to
“vary the decision of the Society”.
I entirely agree with that position, but Government amendments Nos. 78 and 94 already provide the tribunal with a large number of powers, which can be exercised on appeal. They amount to the ability to vary or replace every aspect of a decision that has been appealed. That includes the power to vary the penalty and to make such an order as it sees fit. That gives the tribunal the scope to
“vary the decision of the society”
that my hon. Friend seeks.
Government amendment No. 94 also contains a range of powers that is sufficient to consider an appeal, including the power to vary the amount of the penalty. I hope that those amendments, which give the tribunal wide scope, cover the proper concerns that my hon. Friend raised. I therefore ask him not to press his amendments to a vote.

Amendment agreed to.

Amendments made: No. 70, in schedule 16, page 245, line 49, at end insert ‘, and
(b) the reference to the solicitor or his personal representative in paragraph 13 of that Schedule is to be construed as a reference to the person to whom the notice was given under this section.”’.
No. 71, in schedule 16, page 246, line 15, leave out ‘reference’ and insert ‘references’.
No. 72, in schedule 16, page 246, line 15, after ‘9(5)’, insert ‘and (6)’.
No. 73, in schedule 16, page 246, line 22, at end insert—
‘(7A) Where powers conferred by Part 2 of Schedule 1 to the 1974 Act are exercisable in relation to a person within paragraph (a), (b), (c) or (d) of subsection (2), they continue to be so exercisable after the person has ceased to be a person within the paragraph in question.’.
No. 188, in schedule 16, page 246, line 28, leave out ‘in shares’.
No. 74, in schedule 16, page 246, line 41, after ‘purpose’, insert ‘—
(a) ’.
No. 75, in schedule 16, page 247, line 2, at end insert ‘, and
(b) the reference to the solicitor or his personal representative in paragraph 13 of that Schedule is to be construed as a reference to the person to whom the notice was given under this section.”’.
No. 76, in schedule 16, page 247, line 36, at end insert ‘, and
(c) the reference to the solicitor or his personal representative in paragraph 13 of that Schedule is to be construed as a reference to the person to whom the notice was given under this section.’.
No. 77, in schedule 16, page 248, line 39, at end insert—
‘(5) This section (other than subsection (2)(a)) applies in relation to an employee of a solicitor as it applies in relation to a solicitor.’.
No. 78, in schedule 16, page 248, line 39, at end insert—
‘After that section insert—

“Disciplinary powers of the Society
44D Disciplinary powers of the Society
(1) This section applies where the Society is satisfied—
(a) that a solicitor or an employee of a solicitor has failed to comply with a requirement imposed by or by virtue of this Act or any rules made by the Society, or
(b) that there has been professional misconduct by a solicitor.
(2) The Society may do one or both of the following—
(a) give the person a written rebuke;
(b) direct the person to pay a penalty not exceeding £2,000.
(3) The Society may publish details of any action it has taken under subsection (2)(a) or (b), if it considers it to be in the public interest to do so.
(4) Where the Society takes action against a person under subsection (2)(b), or decides to publish under subsection (3) details of any action taken under subsection (2)(a) or (b), it must notify the person in writing that it has done so.
(5) A penalty imposed under subsection (2)(b) does not become payable until—
(a) the end of the period during which an appeal against the decision to impose the penalty, or the amount of the penalty, may be made under section 44E, or
(b) if such an appeal is made, such time as it is determined or withdrawn.
(6) The Society may not publish under subsection (3) details of any action under subsection (2)(a) or (b)—
(a) during the period within which an appeal against—
(i) the decision to take the action,
(ii) in the case of action under subsection (2)(b), the amount of the penalty, or
(iii) the decision to publish the details,
may be made under section 44E, or
(b) if such an appeal has been made, until such time as it is determined or withdrawn.
(7) The Society must make rules—
(a) prescribing the circumstances in which the Society may decide to take action under subsection (2)(a) or (b);
(b) about the practice and procedure to be followed by the Society in relation to such action;
(c) governing the publication under subsection (3) of details of action taken under subsection (2)(a) or (b);
and the Society may make such other rules in connection with the exercise of its powers under this section as it considers appropriate.
(8) Before making rules under subsection (7), the Society must consult the Tribunal.
(9) A penalty payable under this section may be recovered as a debt due to the Society, and is to be forfeited to Her Majesty.
(10) The Lord Chancellor may, by order, amend paragraph (b) of subsection (2) so as to substitute for the amount for the time being specified in that paragraph such other amount as may be specified in the order.
(11) Before making an order under subsection (10), the Lord Chancellor must consult the Society.
(12) An order under subsection (10) is to be made by statutory instrument subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.
(13) This section is without prejudice to any power conferred on the Society or any other person to make an application or complaint to the Tribunal.
44E Appeals against disciplinary action under section 44D
(1) A person may appeal against—
(a) a decision by the Society to rebuke that person under section 44D(2)(a) if a decision is also made to publish details of the rebuke;
(b) a decision by the Society to impose a penalty on that person under section 44D(2)(b) or the amount of that penalty;
(c) a decision by the Society to publish under section 44D(3) details of any action taken against that person under section 44D(2)(a) or (b).
(2) Subsections (9)(b), (10)(a) and (b), (11) and (12) of section 46 (Tribunal rules about procedure for hearings etc) apply in relation to appeals under this section as they apply in relation to applications or complaints, except that subsection (11) of that section is to be read as if for “the applicant” to “application)” there were substituted “any party to the appeal”.
(3) Rules under section 46(9)(b) may, in particular, make provision about the period during which an appeal under this section may be made.
(4) On an appeal under this section, the Tribunal has power to make such order as it thinks fit, and such an order may in particular—
(a) affirm the decision of the Society;
(b) revoke the decision of the Society;
(c) in the case of a penalty imposed under section 44D(2)(b), vary the amount of the penalty;
(d) in the case of a solicitor, contain provision for any of the matters mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (d) of section 47(2);
(e) in the case of an employee of a solicitor, contain provision for any of the matters mentioned in section 47(2E);
(f) make such provision as the Tribunal thinks fit as to payment of costs.
(5) Where by virtue of subsection (4)(e) an order contains provision for any of the matters mentioned in section 47(2E)(c), section 47(2F) and (2G) apply as if the order had been made under section 47(2E)(c).
(6) An appeal from the Tribunal shall lie to the High Court, at the instance of the Society or the person in respect of whom the order of the Tribunal was made.
(7) The High Court shall have power to make such order on an appeal under this section as it may think fit.
(8) Any decision of the High Court on an appeal under this section shall be final.
(9) This section is without prejudice to any power conferred on the Tribunal in connection with an application or complaint made to it.”’.
No. 79, in schedule 16, page 249, line 34, at end insert—
‘( ) in subsection (1), after paragraph (e) insert—
“(ea) by a solicitor who has been suspended from practice as a sole solicitor for an unspecified period, by order of the Tribunal, for the termination of that suspension;”,
( ) in subsection (2) for “subsection” (where it first occurs) substitute “subsections (2E) and”,
( ) after subsection (2)(b) insert—
“(ba) the revocation of that solicitor’s sole solicitor endorsement (if any);
(bb) the suspension of that solicitor from practice as a sole solicitor indefinitely or for a specified period;”,’.
No. 80, in schedule 16, page 249, line 35, after ‘£5,000”,’ insert—
‘( ) after subsection (2)(e) insert—
“(ea) the termination of that solicitor’s unspecified period of suspension from practice as a sole solicitor;”,
( ) after subsection (2D) insert—
“(2E) On the hearing of any complaint made to the Tribunal by virtue of section 34A(2) or (3), the Tribunal shall have power to make one or more of the following—
(a) an order directing the payment by the employee to whom the complaint relates of a penalty to be forfeited to Her Majesty;
(b) an order requiring the Society to consider taking such steps as the Tribunal may specify in relation to that employee;
(c) if that employee is not a solicitor, an order which states one or more of the matters mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (c) of section 43(2);
(d) an order requiring the Society to refer to an appropriate regulator any matter relating to the conduct of that employee.
(2F) Subsections (1) to (1C), (3) and (4) of section 44 apply in relation to an order under subsection (2E)(c) as they apply in relation to an order under section 43(2).
(2G) Section 44(2), paragraph 16(1)(d) and (1A)(d) of Schedule 2 to the Administration of Justice Act 1985 and paragraph 15(3A) of Schedule 14 to the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 apply in relation to an order under subsection (2E)(c) as they apply in relation to an order under section 43(2).
(2H) For the purposes of subsection (2E)(d) an “appropriate regulator” in relation to an employee means—
(a) if the employee is an authorised person in relation to a reserved legal activity (within the meaning of the Legal Services Act 2007), any relevant approved regulator (within the meaning of that Act) in relation to that employee, and
(b) if the employee carries on activities which are not reserved legal activities (within the meaning of that Act), any body which regulates the carrying on of such activities by the employee.”,’.
No. 81, in schedule 16, page 249, line 41, after ‘Tribunal)’, insert—
‘(a) in subsection (2)(b)—
(i) after “(e),” insert “(ea),”, and
(ii) omit “in the London Gazette”, and
(b) ’.
No. 82, in schedule 16, page 249, line 42, at end insert ‘, and
(c) after subsection (4) insert—
“(5) In the case of orders of the Tribunal under section 44E, the reference in subsection (2)(a) to the application or complaint is to be read as a reference to the Tribunal’s order.”’.
No. 83, in schedule 16, page 250, line 13, after ‘(e)’, insert ‘, (ea)’.
No. 84, in schedule 16, page 251, line 20, after ‘(5)’, insert ‘—
(a) ’.
No. 85, in schedule 16, page 251, line 23, at end insert ‘, and
(b) in paragraph (d) after “solicitor” insert “, or any employee of his who is an authorised person,”.
( ) After that subsection insert—
“(5A) In subsection (5) “authorised person” means a person who is an authorised person in relation to an activity which is a reserved legal activity, within the meaning of the Legal Services Act 2007 (see section 18 of that Act).”’.
No. 86, in schedule 16, page 251, line 43, leave out ‘negligence’ and insert
‘his negligence, or that of any employee of his,’.
No. 87, in schedule 16, page 252, line 27, at end insert ‘, and
(iii) after “solicitor” (in the third place) insert “, or any of his employees,’.
No. 88, in schedule 16, page 252, line 39, at end insert—
‘(d) in paragraph (a), after “solicitor” (in the second place) insert “or an employee of the solicitor”, and
(e) in paragraph (b), after “him” insert “or by any employee of his who is an authorised person (within the meaning of section 56(5A))”.’.
No. 89, in schedule 16, page 257, line 21, after ‘32(1)(a)”,’ insert—
‘( ) after the definition of “sole solicitor” insert—
““sole solicitor endorsement” has the same meaning as in section 1B;”’.
No. 90, in schedule 16, page 257, line 35, at end insert—
‘( ) after “trustee” insert “or that employee is or was a trustee in his capacity as such an employee”,’.
No. 91, in schedule 16, page 258, line 33, leave out paragraph (b) and insert—
‘(b) for paragraph (a) substitute—
“(a) the Society is satisfied that there has been undue delay—
(i) on the part of a solicitor in connection with any matter in which the solicitor or his firm is or was acting on behalf of a client or with any trust, or
(ii) on the part of an employee of a solicitor in connection with any trust of which the employee is or was a trustee in his capacity as such an employee; and”,’.
No. 92, in schedule 16, page 259, line 1, leave out paragraph (b) and insert—
‘(b) in sub-paragraph (2)(a) for “his practice” to the end substitute—
“(i) his practice or former practice,
(ii) any trust of which he is or formerly was a trustee, or
(iii) any trust of which a person who is or was an employee of the solicitor is or was a trustee in the person’s capacity as such an employee;”, and’.
No. 191, in schedule 16, page 265, line 45, after ‘managers’, insert ‘or employees’.
No. 193, in schedule 16, page 266, line 4, leave out ‘in shares’.
No. 194, in schedule 16, page 270, line 42, at end insert
‘, and for this purpose a person has an interest in the body if he has an interest in the body within the meaning of Part 5 of the Legal Services Act 2007 (see sections 72 and 109 of that Act).’.
No. 195, in schedule 16, page 272, line 10, leave out ‘in shares’.
No. 196, in schedule 16, page 272, line 35, leave out ‘in shares’.
No. 93, in schedule 16, page 273, line 3, at end insert—
‘( ) Where powers conferred by Part 2 of Schedule 1 to the 1974 Act are exercisable in relation to a person within paragraph (a), (b) or (c) of sub-paragraph (3), they continue to be so exercisable after the person has ceased to be a person within the paragraph in question.’
No. 94, in schedule 16, page 273, line 38, at end insert—
‘After that paragraph insert—

“Disciplinary powers of the Society
14B (1) This paragraph applies where the Society is satisfied that a recognised body, or a manager or employee of a recognised body, has failed to comply with a requirement imposed by or by virtue of this Act or any rules applicable to that person by virtue of section 9 of this Act.
(2) The Society may do one or both of the following—
(a) give the person a written rebuke;
(b) direct the person to pay a penalty not exceeding £2,000.
(3) The Society may publish details of any action it has taken under sub-paragraph (2)(a) or (b), if it considers it to be in the public interest to do so.
(4) Where the Society takes action against a person under sub-paragraph (2)(b), or decides to publish under sub-paragraph (3) details of such action under sub-paragraph (2)(a) or (b), it must notify the person in writing that it has done so.
(5) A penalty imposed under sub-paragraph (2)(b) does not become payable until—
(a) the end of the period during which an appeal against the decision to impose the penalty, or the amount of the penalty, may be made under paragraph 14C, or
(b) if such an appeal is made, such time as it is determined or withdrawn.
(6) The Society may not publish under sub-paragraph (3) details of any action under sub-paragraph (2)(a) or (b)—
(a) during the period within which an appeal against—
(i) the decision to take the action,
(ii) in the case of action under sub-paragraph (2)(b), the amount of the penalty, or
(iii) the decision to publish the details,
may be made under paragraph 14C, or
(b) if such an appeal has been made, until such time as it is determined or withdrawn.
(7) The Society must make rules—
(a) prescribing the circumstances in which the Society may decide to take action under sub-paragraph (2)(a) or (b);
(b) about the practice and procedure to be followed by the Society in relation to such action;
(c) governing the publication under sub-paragraph (3) of details of action taken under sub-paragraph (2)(a) or (b);
and the Society may make such other rules in connection with the exercise of its powers under this paragraph as it considers appropriate.
(8) Before making rules under sub-paragraph (7), the Society must consult the Tribunal.
(9) A penalty under this paragraph may be recovered as a debt due to the Society, and is to be forfeited to Her Majesty.
(10) The Lord Chancellor may, by order, amend paragraph (b) of sub-paragraph (2) so as to substitute for the amount for the time being specified in that paragraph such other amount as may be specified in the order.
(11) Before making an order under sub-paragraph (10), the Lord Chancellor must consult the Society.
(12) An order under sub-paragraph (10) is to be made by statutory instrument subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.
(13) This paragraph is without prejudice to any power conferred on the Society, or any other person, to make an application or complaint to the Tribunal.
14C (1) A person may appeal against—
(a) a decision by the Society to rebuke that person under paragraph 14B(2)(a) if a decision is also made to publish details of the rebuke;
(b) a decision by the Society to impose a penalty on that person under paragraph 14B(2)(b) or the amount of that penalty;
(c) a decision by the Society to publish under paragraph 14B(3) details of any action taken against that person under paragraph 14B(2)(a) or (b).
(2) Subsections (9)(b), (10)(a) and (b), (11) and (12) of section 46 of the 1974 Act (Tribunal rules about procedure for hearings etc) apply in relation to appeals under this paragraph as they apply in relation to applications or complaints, except that subsection (11) of that section is to be read as if for “the applicant” to “application)” there were substituted “any party to the appeal”.
(3) Rules under section 46(9)(b) of the 1974 Act may, in particular, make provision about the period during which an appeal under this paragraph may be made.
(4) On an appeal under this paragraph, the Tribunal has power to make an order which—
(a) affirms the decision of the Society;
(b) revokes the decision of the Society;
(c) in the case of a penalty imposed under paragraph 14B(2)(b), varies the amount of the penalty;
(d) in the case of a recognised body, contains provision for any of the matters mentioned in paragraph 18(2);
(e) in the case of a manager or employee of a recognised body, contains provision for any of the matters mentioned in paragraph 18A(2);
(f) makes such provision as the Tribunal thinks fit as to payment of costs.
(5) Where, by virtue of sub-paragraph (4)(e), an order contains provision for any of the matters mentioned in sub-paragraph (2)(c) of paragraph 18A, sub-paragraphs (4) and (5) of that paragraph apply as if the order had been made under sub-paragraph (2)(c) of that paragraph.
(6) An appeal from the Tribunal shall lie to the High Court, at the instance of the Society or the person in respect of whom the order of the Tribunal was made.
(7) The High Court shall have power to make such order on an appeal under this paragraph as it may think fit.
(8) Any decision of the High Court on an appeal under this section shall be final.
(9) This paragraph is without prejudice to any power conferred on the Tribunal in connection with an application or complaint made to it.”’.
No. 95, in schedule 16, page 275, line 29, after ‘solicitor’, insert ‘or employee of a solicitor’.
No. 96, in schedule 16, page 275, line 30, leave out ‘his practice as a’ and insert ‘the practice carried on by that’.
No. 197, in schedule 16, page 275, line 47, at end insert—
‘( ) For this purpose a person has an interest in a body if the person has an interest in the body within the meaning of Part 5 of the Legal Services Act 2007 (see sections 72 and 109 of that Act).’.
No. 97, in schedule 16, page 277, line 2, after ‘solicitor’, insert
‘or any employee of the solicitor who is an authorised person’.
No. 98, in schedule 16, page 277, line 23, at end insert—
‘(4) A provision in the agreement that any manager of the body shall be relieved from any responsibility to which the manager would otherwise be subject in the course of the carrying on by the body of its business as a recognised body shall be void.’.
No. 99, in schedule 16, page 280, line 35, leave out ‘or employee’.
No. 100, in schedule 16, page 280, line 37, leave out ‘or employee’.—[Bridget Prentice.]

Bridget Prentice: I beg to move amendment No. 101, in schedule 16, page 281, line 18, after ‘etc)’, insert ‘—
(a) for sub-paragraph (1) substitute—
“(1) Where a recognised body acts as such for a client, any communication, document, material or information is privileged from disclosure in like manner as if the recognised body had at all material times been a solicitor acting for the client.”, and
(b) ’.

Nicholas Winterton: With this, it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments Nos. 102, 18 to 27, 103 to 105 and 107.

Bridget Prentice: The amendments ensure that the provisions in the Bill and in five other statutory provisions are consistent with the common law on legal professional privilege. The Bill already provides that the clients of ABS firms should have the same degree of LPP protection as the clients of any other type of legal service provider. That was set out in what used to be subsections (3) to (7) of clause 182.
 However, both the Bar Council and the Law Society raised the possibility that certain terms in that provision might not reflect fully the current state of the common law of LPP. The wording reflected similar wording used in other statutory provisions that ensure LPP protection for clients of certain legal services providers, such as recognised bodies and licensed conveyancers. We have looked carefully at that and have decided to modify what is now clause 191, as well as the other relevant provisions.
The amendments essentially do two things. First, they remove the reference to legal proceedings in the relevant provisions, because the law provides clients with LPP protection in certain circumstances outside of legal proceedings. Secondly, they expand the reference to communication, because again the law provides clients with LPP protection in certain circumstances, regarding not only communications but documents, material or other information.
Therefore the amendments ensure LPP protection for the clients of ABS firms, so that firms do not operate at a competitive disadvantage compared with other types of provider. They essentially modify five earlier provisions about LPP. Those provisions ensure protection for the clients of other legal service providers, licensed conveyancers, bodies recognised by the Council for Licensed Conveyancers, bodies recognised by the Law Society, patent attorneys, trade mark attorneys and certain authorised practitioners under the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990.
Together the amendments ensure that clients of all of those providers have the LPP protection equivalent to the clients of solicitors. That means that both types of clients are equally protected, no matter where they go for legal services, and no type of provider will get a competitive advantage over other providers as a result. 
The hon. Member for North Southwark and Bermondsey asked about consultation. We have consulted not only the legal professions but the consumer organisations, too. I express particular thanks to both the Bar Council and the Law Society. I suspect that most people would say that that would be an unusual thing for me to do, but in this instance they have been extremely helpful. The Bar Council even went so far as to provide opinion from a legal expert on the subject, which was shared with us, and that opinion informed our reconsideration of the amendments. The Law Society has also provided valuable input. It is a good example of how a co-operative approach can achieve the desired result, for which I am grateful to them all.

Simon Hughes: Thank you, as always, Sir Nicholas, for conducting what is not the most easy stage of our proceedings in such an extremely professional manner.
 Everyone will be reassured by what the Minister said in response to my general point about the amendments. People will be reassured that the Minister has the confidence of both key professional bodies and others who were consulted, who all signed up and came to an agreement. Changing the small print can sometimes conceal a multitude of unexpected consequences, but if all those brains and interests have come together to say that the proposal is wonderful, who are we to presume otherwise?

Amendment agreed to.

Bridget Prentice: I beg to move amendment No. 324, in schedule 16, page 281, line 40, leave out ‘and’ and insert—
‘( ) in that subsection for “officers” substitute “managers”, and’.

Nicholas Winterton: With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendment No. 325.

Bridget Prentice: These amendments are even more straightforward than the previous ones. They replace references in the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 to “officers” of recognised bodies with “managers” of recognised bodies, ensuring consistency with previous amendments to the Administration of Justice Act 1985. The hon. Member for North Southwark and Bermondsey will be pleased that at least the terminology used in relation to Law Society regulated practices is consistent in those two Acts.

Amendment agreed to.

Amendment made: No. 325, in schedule 16, page 281, line 46, at end insert ‘and
( ) in subsection (9), after the definition of “foreign lawyer” insert—
““manager”, in relation to a body, has the same meaning as in the Legal Services Act 2007 (see section 208 of that Act);”.’.—[Bridget Prentice.]

Schedule 16, as amended, agreed to.

Simon Hughes: On a point of order, Sir Nicholas. I want to ask one or two brief questions about clauses 182, 192, 194, 195 and 198, to which there are no amendments. I hope that that is helpful to the Committee.

Nicholas Winterton: I have asked the Clerk to make a note of that request.

Clauses 179 to 181 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 182

Unqualified person not to pretend to be a barrister

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Simon Hughes: The Minister kindly said earlier that she would consider the issue of people not giving information about their professional qualifications at first introduction. The clause will make it an offence for an unqualified person to pretend to be a barrister. Am I right in assuming that that implies that it is not an offence at the moment? I think that everybody assumes that it is.
My understanding is that it is an anomaly that we have never legislated to make it an offence for somebody to present themselves as a barrister. We have such legislation for solicitors, doctors and other professions, so the clause is a welcome addition. This is one of those rare occasions when creating a new offence is a good idea. There are many Government new offences that some of us find OTT, but this might be a useful little addition to the legislation.

Bridget Prentice: The answer is yes, it is an offence. The clause will bring the offence provision into parity with offences under section 21 of the Solicitors Act 1974. The Bar Council has asked the Government to include the clause to uphold the significance of the Inns of Court, which provide education and training for barristers. That is why the clause is needed.

Simon Hughes: That is helpful.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 182 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 183 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 17

Licensed conveyancing

Amendments made: No. 198, in schedule 17, page 295, line 2, leave out ‘of the persons within subsection (5)’ and insert ‘director of the body’.
No. 199, in schedule 17, page 295, leave out lines 4 to 6.
No. 200, in schedule 17, page 295, line 17, after ‘managers’, insert ‘or employees’.
No. 201, in schedule 17, page 295, line 23, leave out ‘in shares’.
No. 102, in schedule 17, page 295, line 26, leave out from beginning to ‘does’ in line 28 and insert—
‘22 For section 33 (legal professional privilege) substitute—
“33 Legal professional privilege
(1) Subsection (2) applies where a licensed conveyancer or recognised body acts as such for a client.
(2) Any communication, document, material or information is privileged from disclosure in like manner as if the licensed conveyancer or body had at all material times been acting as the client’s solicitor.
(3) This section”.’.—[Bridget Prentice.]

Schedule 17, as amended, agreed to.

Clauses 184 to 187 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 18 agreed to.

Clause 188

Claims management services

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Simon Hughes: The clause refers to the Compensation Act 2006, with which the Minister was heavily involved. She made commitments that the Bill would take up matters legislated for in the 2006 Act. In two sentences, will she describe for the record how that is being done? It would be helpful for people to know how one has been married to the other.

Bridget Prentice: I hope that I can help. The idea behind the clause is that the integration of the 2006 Act and the Bill can be achieved only once the LSB and the OLC are fully established. If it is too early to make a decision about the claims management regulation system, that is because that system is itself only a few months old. Although it is working incredibly efficiently, we should give the regime time to bed in and assess its impact when we know how best to deliver that integration with the minimum disruption to the protection that consumers enjoy under the 2006 Act. I hope that that answers the hon. Gentleman’s question.

Simon Hughes: It will at least point me the right direction.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 188 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 19 agreed to.

Clauses 189 and 190 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 191

Legal professional privilege

Amendments made: No. 18, in clause 191, page 103, line 19, leave out from ‘applies’ to end of line 20 and insert
‘where an individual (“P”) who is not a barrister or solicitor—’.
No. 19, in clause 191, page 103, line 21, leave out ‘providing’ and insert ‘provides’.
No. 20, in clause 191, page 103, line 23, leave out ‘providing’ and insert ‘provides’.
No. 21, in clause 191, page 103, line 25, leave out ‘providing’ and insert ‘provides’.
No. 22, in clause 191, page 103, line 27, leave out ‘providing’ and insert ‘provides’.
No. 23, in clause 191, page 103, line 29, leave out from ‘Any’ to ‘privileged’ and insert
‘communication, document, material or information relating to the provision of the services in question is’.
No. 24, in clause 191, page 103, line 33, leave out from ‘(a)’ to ‘services’ in line 34 and insert ‘a licensed body provides’.
No. 25, in clause 191, page 103, line 39, leave out from ‘(4)’ to ‘privileged’ and insert
‘Any communication, document, material or information relating to the provision of the services in question is’.
No. 26, in clause 191, page 103, line 44, leave out paragraph (b).
No. 27, in clause 191, page 104, line 31, after ‘communication’, insert
‘, a document, material or information’.—[Bridget Prentice.]

Clause 191, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 192

Rights of audience etc of employees of housing management bodies

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Simon Hughes: This clause gives rights of audience to employees of housing management bodies. Like the Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley, and others, I represent large numbers of council tenants and the tenants of housing associations and trusts. As we know, housing officers go to the county court on a regular basis to act as if they were a lawyer on behalf of the landlord, to deal with rent arrears, breaches of tenancy, possession actions and other matters.
I have spotted something in the clause that I had assumed was covered, but it is not abundantly clear, as there are lots of different arrangements between housing authorities and other housing providers. There are arm’s length management organisations and other such part-tenant management co-operatives, estate management boards, tenant management boards and others, and the council may have an arrangement with a housing association or housing trust that uses the premises on a short-term basis for homeless people or in cases of domestic violence.
Will the definition in new section 60A(7) of the County Courts Act 1984 cover all those bodies? It does not look as if it will, if one considers the definition of a housing management body. However, I am happy that the Minister has agreed to consider that technical matter, which could be clarified on Report. I am conscious that there has been a huge expansion in those sorts of bodies, and I guess that the proposal is intended to give authority for those issues to be taken up in the county court.
People should know what authority a person has when they go to court. I have had cases in which people are not sure how far down a management tree the responsibility rests, which has led to some fairly junior people, who did not appear to have the authority to deal with those matters, pitching up at county courts. If there is to be fair but effective disposal of matters in county courts, they should not be dealt with by someone who, to put it bluntly, does not have any more authority than doing what they were told when they left the office. I am keen that we should not go so far down the management tree that we are authorising people who do not understand how the county courts and the profession work. There is a practical concern in dealing with all the cases. I would be grateful for a response on whether we should authorise such junior people and whether all eventualities are covered.

Bridget Prentice: I hope that I can reassure the hon. Gentleman. The rights that are outlined in this clause will be exercisable only by those employees of housing management bodies that have an agreement with the local housing authority under section 27 of the Housing Act 1985. They might be former employees of the local authority or housing officers who lost their rights under the local authority when they were transferred over. We have worked with the Department for Communities and Local Government on this, and it has confirmed that the measure covers the huge variety of people mentioned by the hon. Gentleman, but I will double-check to be sure.
Section 27 agreements have to be approved by the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government before they can take effect. I hope that the hon. Gentleman’s second concern, which I share, will fall into that category. Through that system, we will ensure that the person who appears in court is appropriate and has the approval of the Secretary of State through section 27.

Simon Hughes: I am grateful for that.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 192 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 193 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 194

Solicitors to public departments and the city of london

Simon Hughes: I beg to move amendment No. 243, in clause 194, page 106, line 41, leave out subsection (2).
Colleagues will no doubt be glad to know that this is our last amendment. However, it is a slightly heavy and serious point that does not have the levity of some of the other issues. The clause as it stands means that solicitors who are employed in the Government service are not required to comply with the same regulatory system as other solicitors. In the interests of fairness and equity, I want to put the case made by the Law Society, which is that that exemption is no longer justified. The amendment would take away the exemption that allows solicitors in the Government service to operate without a practising certificate, which is a strange anomaly.
It is a core principle that all those who are subject to regulation should contribute to the cost of regulation. Ministers have said that before. In response to the Joint Committee, the Government said that the basic principle is that those being regulated should bear the cost. As far as the cost of regulating solicitors is concerned, the present position is that all solicitors providing legal services in private practice in England and Wales are required to hold and pay for a practising certificate and thus contribute towards the cost. Solicitors also have to qualify to get that certificate.
Solicitors in commerce and in industry and in local government are required to have practising certificates if they undertake reserved activities, or if they are held out as solicitors. For example, if Southwark council’s legal department sent someone to negotiate a contract with a private developer as a solicitor, they would require a practising certificate. Government solicitors, however, are wholly exempt from the need to hold a practising certificate in England and Wales, even if they do the same job as local government solicitors. Scottish solicitors must comply with the same rules as those in private practice or local government. The anomaly applies to England and Wales and dates from the 19th century.
It is unclear why the exemption was originally provided. No logical and persuasive reason has been given, either in the other place or earlier, why the exemption should continue to exist. Given that we are performing a portmanteau tidying-up of the professions—we have just agreed to a schedule dealing with such things—and putting the legal services into a new structure, it seems entirely anomalous that one little reserved, rather self-interested pocket of people in Government will be protected from the same modernisation and streamlining affecting everyone else.

David Burrowes: I support the hon. Gentleman’s view. Does he share my concern that it is important for the Government to take an appropriate lead in tidying up old anomalies? Is he aware of the rebuttal that the Government may well give—that Government lawyers do not hold client money? There is a way to deal with that—by having an amount proportionate to the amount for a practising certificate. It could be less, as in other sectors, rather than being completely thrown away on principle.

Simon Hughes: I am grateful. As the Committee knows, the hon. Gentleman is a solicitor. That is the only argument that has been advanced—that Government lawyers do not take client money as private practice solicitors do. He is absolutely right. Nobody is saying that there should be one flat fee for every solicitor doing every job in England and Wales. There is absolutely an argument for a differential charge.

David Burrowes: There is one already.

Simon Hughes: Yes. There is a sliding scale, and Government solicitors could be incorporated within it. I understand that the Government have already recognised implicitly in other contexts the indefensibility of the present exemption. When the CPS was created in the 1980s, prosecuting solicitors who had worked in local government and held a practising certificate there transferred to the CPS, a central Department. The Government recognised that it was unjustifiable that that change of employer should mean that those solicitors did not have to hold practising certificates, so the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 specifically required CPS solicitors to hold a practising certificate. That remains unaltered today.
Similarly, when the Bar Council’s practising certificate fees came into force as a result of the Access to Justice Act 1999, no provision was made to exclude Government barristers from the need to hold a practising certificate. Both recent changes have integrated practitioners working in the Government service, so there is a discriminatory anomaly relating to solicitors in the general Government service, who are clearly benefiting from something unjustifiable that involves other anomalies, too. Barristers who work for the Government must pay; solicitors who work for Government need not.
It could be regarded as justifiable, I suppose, if the Government claimed—they would have a mini-riot on their hands if they did—that the solicitors who work for them are second-class solicitors. However, those people are not employed as second-class solicitors. They are employed as solicitors, and if one speaks to them or inquires who is in the Department, one is told that they are Government solicitors—solicitors for the Department. They are subject to the same professional discipline as others and to the same rules in other respects.
The Minister will know that the matter arose in the House of Lords. She replied to the point made by the hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate by saying, “They don’t hold client money; therefore, there isn’t a regulatory risk.” However, we are not arguing about the risk factor. We are arguing about the fairness factor and the need for equal treatment of everybody who contributes to the great new edifice of this regulatory regime. The issue is about ensuring that people pay in to fund the process of qualifying to be a solicitor and continue their professional education, which all solicitors are expected to do to advance their careers. It is also about ensuring that the people who administer and enforce the rules of conduct are paid fairly and covering the cost of monitoring and enforcing compliance with the rules of conduct, which is a service that all other solicitors pay for. Government solicitors are governed by those rules, so they are getting the service and paying nothing, which cannot be right.
Government solicitors have regularly to advise on the lawfulness of particular actions, when they want to achieve the objectives of their political masters, which is entirely understandable. To all those to whom I have spoken, to the Law Society and to me, it seems important that those solicitors are subject to the same professional duties—including duties to the court, because they could appear in court—to help to ensure that they give independent legal advice, rather than just the advice that their bosses wish them to give. That is to say that the courts would expect a Government solicitor to be just as honest as any other solicitor when it comes to matters such as duties to the court or conflicts of interest. The courts would not give them any special dispensation because they are in the Government service.
In the other place, the Attorney-General argued that there would be no public benefit from removing the exemption for Government solicitors and that it would only put up the Government’s costs. If Government solicitors are effectively regulated, as they should be, and are subject to the same professional responsibilities as their colleagues in private practice and in commerce and industry, the fact that the Government provide proper training does not negate the point that the basis of employment should be the same. Most firms provide in-house training for their solicitors during their employment. The blunt truth is that the Government are getting solicitors on the cheap, or solicitors in Government service are getting their opportunity to be solicitors on the cheap ahead of everybody else, which cannot be good or fair. The rest of the profession thinks that some protectionism is going on, which is not good. Let us bear in mind also that people from other walks of life come in to and go out of Government service.
I shall now address the hon. Gentleman’s second point. The Law Society has said to the Government that it is inappropriate for the same practising fees to be applied to all sectors, given that there are significant differences between the ways in which different sectors regard the use of regulatory resources. In the case of Government lawyers, the cost of practising certificate fees arguably should be less, for the reasons given by the hon. Gentleman. There are certain activities in which there is no risk at all, but that does not mean that they should be wholly exempt.
The present law does not allow the Law Society to charge differential fees, so the Law Society cannot charge Government lawyers less. The amendments to the Solicitors Act 1974 that we have been discussing would give the Law Society that power. The requirement to hold a practising certificate would not lead to an unfair burden being put on Government lawyers of the future or on Departments, which in practice pay for that certificate. That would mean that there would be no anomalous, unfair exemption.
I am sorry that this is a heavy point for the last evening of the Blair Government, but it is important, because there is a sense of injustice. I am grateful for the hon. Gentleman’s support and hope that I can bring other members of the Committee with me. I also hope that the Minister understands that this is not a matter that I, or others, feel can be left to lie. This is the Bill in which we need to correct this problem.

Henry Bellingham: I shall be brief. I had a lengthy speech to make, but every point that I was going to make has been made by the hon. Member for North Southwark and Bermondsey, so I will just endorse his comments. We in the official Opposition support the amendment and look forward to the Minister giving a proper response and, hopefully, accepting the amendment.

Bridget Prentice: As the hon. Member for North Southwark and Bermondsey said, this is the last evening of the fantastically wonderful Blair Government.
I was a wee bit surprised when the amendment turned up here, because the matter was debated at some length in the other place and even went to a vote, which the Government won. I am sure that much of the reason for that was the fact that the arguments were put so cogently by my noble Friend the Attorney-General. Not only did he put forward the arguments on this provision, but those in the other place were persuaded by them.
As we are being pleasant and friendly on the last evening of the fantastic Blair Government—[Interruption.] Perhaps I am being too friendly; I must stop. The hon. Member for North Southwark and Bermondsey put his case exceptionally well and cogently. However, I wish to explain why the Government won the argument in the other place. As my noble Friend the Attorney-General said, unlike lawyers operating outside, the Government solicitors do not provide services direct to the public, because the Government are their clients.
Government solicitors must have many of the attributes of other solicitors, such as a law degree, completing the academic stage of professional training, being enrolled by the Law Society and so on. They are also bound by the civil service code, which ensures that appointments are made on merit on the basis of a fair and open competition, and that roles are carried out with integrity, honesty, objectivity and impartiality. They are also subject to the employment conditions applicable to their individual Departments.

Bob Neill: The fact that the Government’s solicitors do not provide services to the general public could apply to solicitors in the not-for-profit sector. They are regulated and have to pay a fee, so why should those in the civil service be in a privileged position? It does not make sense. Surely the employment regulations do not have anything to do with regulation as members of a profession.

Bridget Prentice: I should have thought that the not-for-profit sector, almost more than any other, would be dealing directly with the public.

Bob Neill: It could be an in-house solicitor.

Bridget Prentice: Nevertheless, the argument is that the solicitors do not deal directly with the public. They are subject to the employment conditions applicable to their individual Departments. I am not aware of evidence of any serious failure in the Government’s legal services, although no doubt some hon. Members could think of some. The head of that service is diligent in performing his duty to ensure that a strong and proportionate system of regulation is in place to ensure that high standards are met at all times.
I mentioned earlier the annual turnover of some £20-plus billion in the legal sector. I know that, despite what some newspapers would have us believe, not every lawyer is a fat cat, but many of them are fairly comfortable cats—I do not see many signs of poverty in Chancery lane—so I do not see the justification for paying something in the region of £850,000 of public money to the Law Society to cover a charge for issuing practising certificates.
The hon. Gentleman made a cogent argument, but I must resist the amendment. As my noble Friend the Attorney-General was so clearly able to persuade his colleagues in the other place, I hope that I shall similarly persuade him to withdraw the amendment.

Simon Hughes: The Minister is as charming as ever, but on this occasion her arguments do not rise to the level of her charm. I have not tried to hide the fact that there would be a cost. The Government have two ways to deal with that. They either meet the cost of the things that are needed for an employee, as an employer normally does, or they say, “You can only be employed if you have a practising certificate.” That could, therefore, not put the burden on the taxpayer but be like saying, “We will employ you, put in the adverts, have a word with the Government, but you have to come with a practising certificate.” Many people do their jobs and pay their annual fee to remain qualified—whether that is tax deductible is a different matter.
I think that the Minister knows that there is an anomaly and I think that the very estimable Lord Goldsmith, the Attorney-General—for the time being—knows that, too. He will not have to defend that anomaly after tomorrow, but the Minster will—[Laughter.] Well, I hope that she will. The Attorney-General has said that he is going and the Minister has not said that she is. If we report faithfully what she has said tonight and feed it into the system, no doubt that will boost her chances of promotion, which my hon. Friend and I both want her to benefit from.
I am afraid that I do not accept the argument and will, just to make sure that we never lose the opportunity to practise, press the amendment to a vote.

Question put, That the amendment be made:—

The Committee divided: Ayes 5, Noes 9.

Question accordingly negatived.

Clause 194 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 195

Payments in respect of pro bono representation

Bridget Prentice: I beg to move amendment No. 323, in clause 195, page 108, line 11, leave out ‘under section 3’ and insert ‘in accordance with section 3A’.
The clause allows the court to make an order for costs in cases where the successful party has been represented pro bono. Although the work might have been done free of charge, the court could order a sum to be paid in respect of that work to a registered charity prescribed by the Lord Chancellor, and that charity will then be able to administer and distribute those funds to provide legal advice and help where it is needed most.
The clause applies in civil proceedings where the party in whose favour the cost order is given was represented on a pro bono basis by a lawyer, and will overcome an anomaly in cost law by allowing such cases to be treated in a similar way to normal fee-paying cases. The result will be a more level playing field in which both parties to the litigation are potentially liable for costs. I hope that that might encourage the earlier settlement of cases that are currently being pursued through the courts, as the opponent of a party who is represented pro bono will know from the outset that, if he loses, he may still have to pay something for the other parties’ representations in addition to his own costs.
Since the clause was first drafted we have made changes regarding registration in the Charities Act 1993, and to reflect that, the amendment is a technical one. I shall now look at the clause in more detail. Subsections (5) and (6) will prevent an order from being made against a person who is funded entirely by civil legal aid or is represented pro bono. It was felt that to expose those groups of people to one of these orders might put undue pressure on the civil legal aid fund or discourage people from offering pro bono assistance. Subsection (7) allows the rules of court to be made about making those orders. It is envisaged that those rules will be set out alongside the procedural matters—the factors that the court should have regard to, in addition to those in subsection (4).
Under subsections (3), (8) and (9) the sums generated by the cost orders will be directed to the charity prescribed by the Lord Chancellor, which will be registered in accordance with the Charities Act 1993. The charity will administer the payments that it receives for the benefit of the pro bono community generally, and recognised pro bono organisations and projects in particular. There is a small technical change that it is appropriate to look at. Under the 1993 Act, registration is in section 3; once that Act is amended by the Charities Act 2006, it will appear under section 3A. The amendment to subsection (9)(a) reflects that change, which I hope will be acceptable.
When the prescribed charity was discussed in the other place, amendments were tabled. The first of those would have allowed those undertaking pro bono work to nominate any charity to receive individual awards, and the second would have obliged the prescribed charity to consider the lawyer’s wishes in distributing awards. The Attorney-General, whose national pro bono co-ordinating committee has been a driver behind the current proposal, resisted those amendments. He explained that the fact that the prescribed charity would be a national body, able to effect strategic distribution of funds to the whole pro bono community, was one of its most valuable assets. It would be regrettable to bind the charity to a statutory obligation to take a particular lawyer’s expression of preference into account, when none of the other factors that may be considered in distributing the moneys would be expressed in the Bill.
The Attorney-General offered the reassurance that one of the factors that the prescribed charity would have regard to when making decisions—probably through guiding principles rather than as a constitutional fetter—would be any preference expressed by the legal representatives acting in a particular case. However, those preferences would not be determinative. If there was much of an advantage to the strategic perspective offered by the national charity, that would be lost. On that basis, the amendments were withdrawn.
On 16 April, we issued a consultation paper setting out our proposals for secondary legislation provided for by the clause, including any possible changes to procedural rules needed to help the courts deliver the provision. It has been made widely available to, among others, those who will benefit from the legislation, and to Members of this House, so that they have an opportunity to comment if they so wish.

Henry Bellingham: I thank the Minister for her explanation. She is right to tell the Committee that the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, the hon. and learned Member for Redcar (Vera Baird) wrote to the Conservative Front Benchers, and I would imagine to the Liberal Democrat Front Benchers also, to explain what the Government are going to do. We are content with the amendment.

Amendment agreed to.

Clause 195, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 196 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 20 agreed to.

Clause 197 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 198

Offences committed by bodies corporate and unincorporated bodies

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Simon Hughes: I have one question for the Minister, and I will be happy if she gives the answer in writing at the earliest practical date. The clause sets out the offences that can be committed by corporate bodies and unincorporated bodies. I always like to do an offence-watch exercise on each piece of legislation, and I wonder whether we can be told, possibly by letter, how many new offences will be created as a result of the, and how many current offences will be repealed. That will enable us to see the balance of criminality that we are left with as a result of the Bill.

Bridget Prentice: I am happy to provide the Committee with that information at a later date.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 198 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 199 to 207 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 208

Interpretation

Amendment proposed: No. 126, in clause 208, page 118, line 3, at end insert—
‘“independent trade union” has the same meaning as in the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 (c. 52) (see section 5 of that Act);’—[Bridget Prentice.]

Question put, That the amendment be made.

The Committee divided: Ayes 11, Noes 3.

Question accordingly agreed to.

Amendments made: No. 127, in clause 208, page 118, line 18, leave out ‘a’ and insert ‘an independent’.
No. 128, in clause 208, page 118, leave out lines 33 to 35.—[Bridget Prentice.]

Clause 208, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 209 to 211 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 212

Commencement

Bridget Prentice: I beg to move amendment No. 28, in clause 212, page 120, line 5, leave out from ‘Chancellor’ to end of line 24.
This amendment reverses one that was made in the other place. The Lords amendment imposed two conditions on the commencement of part 5 of the Bill, which deals with ABS. The first condition was that more research needed to be conducted into the possible effects of ABS and then the results of that research would have to be considered by Parliament before part 5 could be commenced. The second condition was that, unlike the rest of the Bill, part 5 could only be commenced with the approval of both Houses under the affirmative resolution procedure.
 Frankly, I cannot see that further research would add anything constructive to the Bill. Baroness Ashton took pains to explain in the other place that such research could achieve only two things: either it would compare our reforms with other jurisdictions, in which case we would learn very little that is relevant, or it would try to estimate the effects of the ABS in the absence of any firms actually being operational, in which case we would get a lot of theory but there would be little chance of discovering anything based on hard evidence. Neither type of information would be much help to Parliament in approving a commencement order.
We have already commissioned research and used it to inform the Bill. Between the Clementi report and our White Paper, well-respected academics examined the benefits of multi-ownership models and law services’ multi-disciplinary practices, as well as the organisational structure of legal firms. They all concluded that the ABS proposals were sensible and did not present unacceptable risks.
If we do not deal with clause 212, there is also a risk of delay. It will be some time before part 5 is commenced, which will happen in 2010 or 2011. It may seem as if there is plenty of time to do research, but, of course, there could be other developments before then. Consequently, we would risk the results of such research becoming even less relevant. To defer the commencement of part 5 to take account of the most up-to-date developments would mean risking part 5 not being ready in time or having little relevance.
 We do not want to delay the benefits that part 5 offers consumers. I believe that the timetable is sensible. It ensures that the board will begin approving licensing authorities only when it and the authorities are ready, which will necessarily take some time. There is no justification for delay beyond that time, other than the reasonable caution that I would expect licensing authorities to exercise when they start their work. There is even less justification for imposing a requirement to carry out further research when there is little point behind the research and little chance of producing anything useful beyond what we already know.
 The other troublesome element in clause 212 is the requirement for an affirmative resolution for any commencement order, which is a kind of sunrise clause. I do not agree that that measure is necessary, and it was not proposed by the Delegated Powers Committee. Commencement orders are not normally subject to parliamentary procedure, particularly affirmative procedure, and I see no reason to change things here. If anything, this requirement for affirmative procedure is a crude, clumsy attempt to put obstacles in the way of part 5 and specifically to give a veto to those in the House of Lords who oppose the concept of ABS, but whose arguments have failed to win the debate on the principle. Taken with the requirement for more research, hon. Members could be forgiven for thinking that this was a wrecking amendment, or a wrecking clause.
Bearing all that in mind, I urge the Committee to support my amendment to remove that clause from the Bill.

Henry Bellingham: I have listened to what the Minister has said and I can tell her that, although we are not particularly happy with the Government amendment, which will overturn what was inserted in the House of Lords, we will not vote against it, as she has made some good points. We are very disappointed indeed that the Government have decided to overturn a number of other Lords amendments, but we have had those debates already. I think that the Government have been curmudgeonly and ungenerous, but on this occasion the debate has rolled on and some greater understanding and realisation have been achieved. That particular Lords amendment was not completely spot on, which it should have been, so we will not force a vote.

Simon Hughes: This is the last controversial amendment. I am willing to do the Government a deal, but I do not think that the Minister will buy it: the terms are that she withdraws the amendment and we give her no trouble on the remaining two Government amendments to be debated before our consideration of the Bill is completed. I merely give her a chance to reflect, but it does not look like she is likely to buy it.
The second thing to say before dealing with the substance of the matter is that there are two pressures on those of us who are considering what to do on this amendment: pressure from the Minister and her desire to move on to introduce alternative business structures, and pressure from my colleagues and independents in the other place, who voted to secure a majority of 68 for the amendment, which she is seeking to undo. I would rather face the wrath of the Minister on a temporary basis than that of all 78 colleagues, which is how many there were before the Government started making overtures to them earlier in the week.
 On the substance of my main point, like the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk, I reflected seriously on the matter. I did not say, “We must absolutely hold the line just because that was the view that my colleagues took in the other place.” I reflected on whether we should change our position. On balance, I decided that we should not do so, that we should support the Bill as it is and that we should oppose the Government amendment. There are three reasons for that.
First, there is still huge concern among many interested people about the introduction of ABS, and an independent report at this stage—after all the debate on the Bill—would produce a new ability to assess the benefits and disbenefits. Yes, such a report might draw on other jurisdictions and other assessments, and it would not be based on practice, but given that there is nothing else that one can use for assessment, one has to use the best evidence available, which would be up to date.
Secondly, we must address the access to justice concerns, which we have already discussed. Thirdly, there must be the ability to have a sunrise clause. As the Minister knows, other Bills have included sunrise clauses. A sunrise clause would mean that there would have to be parliamentary agreement to press the button on the new business structures, which is, on balance, the right side of the line.
The debate has moved on, as the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk has said, but I am still persuaded that there are sufficient concerns for us to believe that the House of Lords was right on this issue, that we need to proceed with caution, and that that reflects the view reached by the Joint Committee and during earlier consideration. The Government are pushing too hard and too fast in that direction.
In any event, if the Government’s proposals are winning arguments and can win people around to their way of thought, they will also win the vote. I hope, for the time being, that colleagues will accept that it is better to proceed carefully and cautiously, and that this is such an approach to what could be a harmful, as well as potentially beneficial, option.

Bridget Prentice: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for the way in which he has put his concerns. Sir David Clementi was on a number of occasions, not least quite recently in a meeting organised by the Bar Council, very supportive of our ABS proposals, in which I believe absolutely. I do not think that ABS will happen overnight anyway, which is why I do not think that the amendment needs to stand, even if I agreed with it in the first place. It is much more likely that local development plans will be up and running before multidisciplinary practices come into being. As the hon. Gentleman knows, we are looking at one aspect of that to see whether other areas can be accommodated.
 I believe that the motive in the other place was to scupper this part of the Bill. Despite what hon. Members have said, nothing that I have heard has dissuaded me from that view. I believe that a cautious approach will be taken when the board, the regulators and the licensing authorities begin, and that the world will not turn into an ABS overnight. It is still a little way off, so we have time to ensure that we get the right rules and regulations in place for the licensing authorities to do their work properly. The Consumer Panel is of the view that the Lords amendment was a wrecking amendment, and all consumer groups are keen to for us to go ahead with the Bill as originally drafted.

Simon Hughes: A range of views was expressed in the other place, as elsewhere. Some people are implacably opposed to part 5 of the Bill and have heard nothing to change their minds, but others take a more cautious and incremental view. I share the Minister’s opinion that some hold that view, but I thought it better to hold on to my position because it accommodates a broader range of opinion than proceeding in the way suggested by the Minister.

Bridget Prentice: I understand what the hon. Gentleman says, but it is important that we move on. We are trying in part 5 to give the opportunity for ABS to happen within the framework that I have described. Certainly, there will be caution at the beginning in order to ensure that everyone is satisfied and that the new system works properly. Those not motivated by principled objections who want to ensure that we get it right should be reassured that everything else that builds into part 5 will ensure that a proper approach is taken.

Question put, That the amendment be made:—

The Committee divided: Ayes 9, Noes 2.

Question accordingly agreed to.

Clause 212, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 213 and 214 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 215

Short title

Bridget Prentice: I beg to move amendment No. 29, in clause 215, page 120, line 37, leave out subsection (2).
The amendment removes the privilege provision included in the other place.

Amendment agreed to.

Clause 215, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 21

Minor and Consequential amendments

Amendments made: No. 103, in schedule 21, page 337, line 10, leave out paragraph (a) and insert—
‘( ) in subsection (1), after “to” (in the first place) insert “—
(a) ”,
( ) at the end of that subsection insert “, and
(b) documents, material or information relating to any matter mentioned in paragraph (a).”, and
( ) for subsection (2) substitute—
“(2) Where a patent attorney acts for a client in relation to a matter mentioned in subsection (1), any communication, document, material or information to which this section applies is privileged from disclosure in like manner as if the patent attorney had at all material times been acting as the client’s solicitor.”,’.
No. 104, in schedule 21, page 337, line 14, at end insert ‘, and
( ) omit subsection (4).’
No. 105, in schedule 21, page 343, line 30, leave out paragraph (a) and insert—
‘( ) in subsection (1), after “to” (in the first place) insert “—
(a) ”,
( ) at the end of that subsection insert “, and
(b) documents, material or information relating to any matter mentioned in paragraph (a).”, and
( ) for subsection (2) substitute—
“(2) Where a trade mark attorney acts for a client in relation to a matter mentioned in subsection (1), any communication, document, material or information to which this section applies is privileged from disclosure in like manner as if the trade mark attorney had at all material times been acting as the client’s solicitor.”’.—[Bridget Prentice.]

Bridget Prentice: I beg to move amendment No. 326, in schedule 21, page 344, line 14, at end insert—

‘Police Act 1996 (c. 16)
In section 84 of the Police Act 1996 (representation at disciplinary and other proceedings), in subsection (2) for “either by counsel or by a solicitor” substitute “by a person who, for the purposes of the Legal Services Act 2007, is an authorised person in relation to an activity which constitutes the exercise of a right of audience (within the meaning of that Act)”.’
This is the final amendment. It is a minor and consequential amendment, which updates the Police Act 1996 so that it is consistent with the framework set out in the Bill. At the moment, members of the police force may be represented by counsel or a solicitor in disciplinary proceedings. Under the Bill, persons other than counsel or solicitors may have the same rights in respect of reserved legal activities. The amendment therefore sets out that representatives will be defined by their authorisation in respect of reserved legal activities—in this case, rights of audience—instead of by any professional or other title.

Amendment agreed to.

Schedule 21, as amended, agreed to.

Schedule 22 agreed to.

Schedule 23

Repeals

Amendments made: No. 106, in schedule 23, page 362, line 39, column 2, at end insert—
‘In section 48(2)(b) “in the London Gazette”.’.
No. 107, in schedule 23, page 367, line 30, column 2, leave out from beginning to end of line 31 and insert—
‘In section 280—
(a) in subsection (3) “or” at the end of paragraph (b), and
(b) subsection (4).’.
—[Bridget Prentice.]

Schedule 23, as amended, agreed to.

Schedule 24

Index of defined expressions

Amendments made: No. 202, in schedule 24, page 371, line 14, at end insert—
‘independent trade union
section 208’.
No. 203, in schedule 24, page 371, line 14, at end insert—
‘indirect interest (of a non-authorised person in a licensable body)
section 72’.
No. 204, in schedule 24, page 371, line 15, column 1, leave out ‘in shares’.
No. 205, in schedule 24, page 373, leave out line 2.—[Bridget Prentice.]

Schedule 24, as amended, agreed to.

New Clause 3

Professional representations
‘Section 10 shall apply mutatis mutandis to representations by approved regulators whether in their regulatory or representive capacity.’.—[Mr. Bellingham.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time:—

The Committee divided: Ayes 5, Noes 9.

Question accordingly negatived.

Written evidence

Ordered, That certain written evidence already reported to the House be appended to the proceedings of the Committee.—[Bridget Prentice.]

Bridget Prentice: On a point of order, Sir Nicholas. It is a pleasure to make the final statement in Committee. I shall shortly be thanking the huge variety of people who have so greatly contributed in bringing the Bill to Committee and in improving it in the course of the Committee debates.
First, however, let me state my belief that, when the Bill receives Royal Assent—as I am sure that it will—it will be among the most significant statutes produced by any Government in improving legislation for consumers. I do not say that lightly—I am convinced that it is the case—and I am particularly pleased and proud to have been involved in making it happen. No matter what happens later this week, I know that through the passage of the Bill I have at least played a part in making consumers’ lives a great deal better.
 I thank the Bill team, which, not surprisingly—given that the Bill has 215 clauses and 24 schedules—is quite large. They have been magnificent in providing advice and amendments, and in giving advice and support to the Opposition, when they have asked for it, in clarifying issues. I am grateful to Nigel Reeder and his team for the work that they have done. I am also grateful to the Clerks to the Committee, who have been extremely helpful, always courteous and always ready to offer excellent advice. The new system of explanatory memorandums at the end of amendments has been a marvellous improvement, for which we have been the pilot, and I hope that it will be adopted elsewhere.
I thank colleagues on both sides of the House for their courteous, humorous and always gracious conduct in the debate. I am particularly grateful for the contributions of my hon. Friends. I feel as if I now know virtually everybody who lives in Bassetlaw, and I certainly think that people in North Durham visit their solicitors far too often. Nevertheless, those contributions were important and focused us on some critical issues. I am grateful also to the Opposition for the way in which they have conducted themselves.
 I thank my Parliamentary Private Secretary, and those who have at intervals acted as PPS, for making sure that I have all the relevant information, and my hon. Friend the Whip for glaring at us when we went on too long. I thank all the organisations that have been involved on both sides—the consumer side and the legal profession. Particular thanks also go to you, Sir Nicholas, and to your colleague, Frank Cook, for your wonderful supervision of our proceedings and for the charming way in which you have kept us in line. That has ensured that the Bill is better than when we began.

Henry Bellingham: Further to that point of order, Sir Nicholas. There is not time to go into detail but, on behalf of the official Opposition, I endorse everything that the Minister has said.

Simon Hughes: Likewise, I offer my thanks to you, Sir Nicholas, to Mr. Cook and to the Clerks who have done a sterling job. Above all, I pay tribute to the Minister who has single-handedly led for the Government in Committee and who deserves our thanks. The Committee has been happy and successful.

Nicholas Winterton: I congratulate the whole Committee. From my point of view, it has been a very agreeable and constructive Committee. I congratulate the Front-Bench spokesmen, and I particularly congratulate the Minister on handling a Bill entirely on her own, although no doubt with good back-up from the civil service. I thank my Clerk, the Doorkeepers, the police and the Hansard writers. If every Committee ran as smoothly, this place would perhaps run more smoothly as a whole. Thank you all for your complimentary remarks, and I shall pass on your thanks to Mr. Cook.

Bill, as amended, to be reported.

Committee rose at one minute past Ten o’clock.